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Abstract 
This paper studies some effects of real-time information on the implementation of monetary policy. We 
consider an economy in which several sources of uncertainty, such as measurement errors and 
imperfectly observable states, do not allow the policymaker to identify the true state of the economy. 
Optimal policy thus requires the policymaker to jointly solve a filtering and an optimisation problem. 
We focus in particular on the case of a non-observable measure of potential output and analyse the 
consequences of this assumption for the macroeconomy (policy, output and inflation). The paper 
provides a benchmark model to assess the claim that conditioning policy on a potential output 
measure using real-time data may be at the root of a biased policy stance, as recently suggested by 
Orphanides. More generally, it offers a rigorous framework to analyse the effects of imperfect 
information and to assess the role of macroeconomic indicators in alleviating information problems. 
1.  Introduction and main findings 
This note discusses recent results concerning monetary policy with real-time information.
2 The theme 
of this paper is that the implementation of monetary policy is often faced with the difficult task of taking 
decisions in the presence of high uncertainty. Policy decisions require knowledge of a structural 
economic model and of the state of the economy (the realisation of the different shocks impinging on 
it). Such information is rarely available to the policymaker. Taking decisions in real time, when the 
latest data on some target variables (eg inflation, employment and output) may not be available, or 
may be subject to substantial measurement errors, requires an efficient filtering of the available 
information to ensure the best possible inference on the state of the economy is formed. 
An example illustrates the nature of this basic problem faced by central banks. A stabilising role for 
monetary policy crucially hinges on some notion of “potential output”, a non-observable economic 
variable representing the desirable (or target) level at which actual output should be. The conduct of 
monetary policy requires, therefore, that the central bank estimates, and continually updates, its 
potential output forecast. Orphanides (2000a,b, 2001) provides persuasive support for the view that a 
significant overestimation of potential output during the oil shocks of the 1970s aggravated inflation at 
that time by leading to a monetary policy stance which turned out to be, with the benefit of hindsight, 
excessively loose ex post. Somewhat symmetrically, the strong productivity gains recorded in the 
United States during the second half of the 1990s raised the possibility, again with the benefit of 
hindsight, that the subsequently greater than expected increases in potential output could have 
allowed for a less restrictive monetary policy stance than that initially suggested by real-time estimates 
of inflation and the output gap. 
The work of Orphanides sheds interesting new light on monetary policy during the 1970s and raises an 
important question about whether such retrospective policy mistakes can be avoided in the future. If 
they were due to poor but correctable forecasting procedures or to an inefficient specification of the 
“policy rule”, a likely answer to this question is yes. Assessing the extent to which such mistakes were 
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due to “bad policies” rather than to “bad luck” requires a model which identifies optimal monetary policy 
under imperfect information. Once this benchmark is defined, and its properties are established, one 
can proceed to evaluate the extent to which (retrospective) policy errors were avoidable. 
This paper contributes to the debate on the effects of imperfect information by proposing such a 
benchmark model and analysing its properties. It is shown that, given the structure of information, 
some policy decisions which are judged ex post to be mistakes may be unavoidable even if the central 
bank utilises the most efficient forecasting procedures. Moreover, such retrospective mistakes are 
small during periods in which changes in potential output are small, and large during periods 
characterised by substantial changes in the long-run trend of output. During the latter episodes, policy 
mistakes in a given direction are likely to persist for some time. 
The evidence in Orphanides (2001) supports the view that monetary policy during the 1970s was 
excessively loose since a permanent reduction in potential output was interpreted for some time as a 
negative output gap. The analytical framework of this paper provides an “optimising” analytical 
foundation for this mechanism and identifies the conditions under which it operates.
3 Interestingly, a 
large permanent decrease in potential output does not lead to an excessively loose policy stance 
under all circumstances. Whether it does or not depends on the relative persistence of demand and of 
cost shocks, and on other parameters like the degree of conservativeness of the central bank. 
While the theoretical analysis suggests that imperfect information may lie at the root of a “biased” 
policy stance (judged with the benefit of hindsight), a preliminary quantitative assessment of the 
effects of imperfect information indicates that the effects of such biases on the main macroeconomic 
variables are not very large. While preliminary, this finding seems to suggest that it is difficult to 
“explain” the high inflation of the 1970s as a consequence of imperfect information alone. 
These results are first presented by means of a simple model by Cukierman and Lippi (2002), which 
captures the conception of many central banks about the transmission process of monetary policy. The 
advantage of this simple formulation lies in the tractability of the analytical framework. That model 
identifies conditions under which the presence of imperfect information leads monetary policy to be 
systematically tighter than under perfect information in periods of permanent increases in potential output 
and to be too loose relative to this benchmark in periods of permanent reductions in potential output. The 
reason is that, even when they filter available information in an optimal manner, policymakers as well as 
the public at large detect permanent changes in potential output only gradually. When, as was the case 
in the 1970s, there is a permanent decrease in potential output, policymakers interpret part of this 
reduction as a negative output gap and loosen monetary policy too much in comparison to the no 
permanent-temporary confusion (PTC) benchmark. Thus, in periods of large permanent decreases in 
productivity, inflation accelerates because of the relatively expansionary monetary policy stance. 
Conversely, when - as might have been the case in the United States during the 1990s - a “new 
economy” permanently raises the potential level of output, inflation goes down since, as policymakers 
interpret part of the permanent increase in potential output as a positive output gap, policy is tighter than 
under perfect information. A main novel result of the paper is that, even when the information available to 
policymakers in real time is used efficiently and monetary policy chosen optimally, errors of forecast in 
real-time estimates of potential output and of the output gap are serially correlated retrospectively. In 
general, this serial correlation is induced by shocks to potential output, as well as to the cyclical 
components of output. 
We subsequently show how similar results can be produced by a more up-to-date forward-looking model 
of the “new synthesis” variety developed by Woodford (1999) and Clarida et al (1999). 
2.  The background analytical framework 
The problems analysed in the following can be framed within the setup and notation used by 
Svensson and Woodford (2000) to model a linear-quadratic economy with two agents, a government 
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and an aggregate private sector, which are assumed to have the same imperfect information on the 
state of the economy. We use the algorithms developed by Gerali and Lippi (2002) to solve this 
problems numerically using MATLAB. 























































where Xt+1 is a vector of nX predetermined variables in period t (natural state variables), xt is a vector 
of nx forward-looking variables, i is a vector of ni policy instruments, ut is a vector of nX iid shocks with 
mean zero and covariance  ,
2
u Σ and A
1,
  A
2  and B are matrices of appropriate dimension. For any 
variable z t, the notation  τ t z  denotes the expectation,  [ ], τ I z E t  ie the rational expectation of z t with 
respect to the information Iτ available in period τ. 




























2 1  (2.2) 
where C
1, C
2 and Ci are matrices of appropriate dimension. Let the quadratic form describing the 
period loss function be given by: 
t t t WY Y L   ′ ≡   (2.3) 
where W is a positive semi-definite matrix of weights. The government actions are aimed at minimising 
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where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal discount factor. 




























2 1  (2.5) 
where the “noise” vector vt is assumed to be iid with covariance matrix  .
2
v Σ  Information It in period t is: 
{}
2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 , , , , , , , , , , , ; , v u i t W D D C C C B A A t Z I Σ Σ δ ≤ τ ≡ τ  
3.  Application 1 (from Cukierman and Lippi (2002)) 
This section presents a simplified version of the backward-looking sticky price model presented in 
Svensson (1997). Although the model is not rooted in explicit microfoundations, it is likely to reflect the 
views of several central banks about the transmission process of monetary policy. Its main advantage 
is that it allows the basic consequences of imperfect information to be illustrated analytically in a 
relatively simple manner. We therefore maintain the assumption that this reduced form model captures 
the actual behaviour of the economy. A richer economic structure, incorporating transmission lags or 
forward-looking variables, does not eliminate the effects described in the paper (eg Ehrmann and 
Smets (2001)) but may introduce new ones. Although such models may be preferable for theoretical 
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3.1 The  economy 
In this framework (the logarithm of) output (yt) and inflation (πt) are determined, respectively, as 
follows:  
t t t t g r z y + ϕ − =   (3.1) 
t t t t u z y + − λ = π ) (   (3.2) 
Here zt denotes (the log of) potential output at period t, rt is a real short-term interest rate, gt is a 
demand shock and ut a cost push shock. This framework postulates that potential output z is   
a fundamental long-run determinant of actual output. But, in addition, actual output is also affected by 
a demand shock and by the real rate of interest, which for given inflationary expectations is 
determined in turn by the (nominal) interest rate policy of the central bank. 
In line with conventional macroeconomic wisdom, we postulate that the demand and cost shocks are 
less persistent than changes in potential output, which are affected by long-run factors like technology 
and the accumulation of physical and human capital. The permanence of shocks to potential output is 
modelled by assuming that zt is a random walk.
4 More specifically, we postulate the following 
stochastic processes for the shocks:  
) , 0 ( ~ ˆ ; 1 0 ˆ 2
1 g t t t t N g g g g σ < µ < + µ = −  (3.3) 
) , 0 ( ~ ˆ ; 1 0 ˆ
2
1 u t t t t N u u u u σ < ρ < + ρ = −  (3.4) 
t t t z z z ˆ 1 + = −           ) , 0 ( ~ ˆ
2
z t N z σ  (3.5) 
To reiterate, the main purpose of this simple model is to characterise the macroeconomic 
consequences of optimally chosen monetary policy (ie a sequence for rt) when policymakers cannot 
identify with certainty (not even retrospectively) the sources of output changes. 
3.2 Monetary  policy 
The policy instrument is the nominal interest rate. But since prices are temporarily sticky, the 
policymaker can bring about the real rate he desires by setting the nominal rate. For convenience and 
without loss of generality, we can therefore consider the policymaker as setting the real interest rate rt. 
This policy instrument is set at the beginning of period t before output, inflation (yt and πt) and period t 
shocks are realised. The policy objective is to minimise the objective function:  
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j
t J x E L  (3.6) 
where  t t t z y x − ≡  denotes the output gap (defined as the difference between (the logarithms of) actual 
and potential output) and Jt–1 is the information set available at the beginning of period t, when rt is 
chosen. The first-order condition for the discretionary (time-consistent) monetary policy  ) (min t r L
t  
implies: 
1 1 − − π
α
λ
− = t t t t x   (3.7) 
Here  πt|t–1  and  xt|t–1 are the expected values of inflation and of the output gap conditional on the 
information available at the beginning of period t, Jt–1. At this stage we note that Jt–1 contains, inter alia, 
observations on actual inflation and output up to and including period t − 1. A full specification of Jt–1 
appears below. Since the values of inflation and of the output gap at period t are not known with 
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certainty at the beginning of period t, those variables (which are indirectly controlled by policy) appear 
in equation (3.7) in expected terms. 
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= π t t t t t t t t u u g g u  (3.10) 
3.3  The structure of information and optimal policy 
The interest rate rule in equation (3.8) implies that the optimal real interest rate policy for period t + 1, 
rt+1, requires the policymaker to form expectations about the values of the demand shock and the cost 
push shocks, gt+1 and ut+1. Although he does not observe those shocks directly, the policymaker 
possesses information about economic variables from which noisy, but optimal, forecasts of the 
shocks can be derived. In particular, we assume that policymakers know the true structure of the 
economy:  { }
2 2 2 , , , , , , z g u σ σ σ µ ρ λ ϕ ≡ Ω  but do not know the precise stochastic sources of fluctuations in 
output and inflation. 
Thus, when the interest rate rt+1 is chosen, at the beginning of period t + 1, the policymaker forms 
expectations about gt+1 and ut+1 using historical data. The latter consists of observations on output and 
inflation up to and including period t. The information available at the beginning of period t + 1 is 
summarised by the information set: 
} , 2 , 1 , 0 , , { K = π Ω = − − i y J i t i t t  (3.11) 
which is used to form the conditional expectations: gt+1|t and ut+1|t. Past observations on output and 
inflation are equivalent to past observations on the two signals, s1,t and s2,t (obtained by rearranging 
equations (3.9) and (3.10)):  
t t t t t t t t g z u g y s + =
λ + α
λ
+ + ≡ − − 1 2 1 , 1  (3.12) 
t t t t t t t t u g u g s + λ =
λ + α
λ
+ λ + π ≡ − − 1 2
2
1 , 2  (3.13) 
where variables to the left of the equality sign are observed separately while those to the right are not. 
Clearly, s1,t and s2,t contain (noisy) information on gt and ut which can be used to make inferences on 
gt+1 and  1 + t u , using the fact that  t t g | 1 + = µgt|t and  t t u | 1 +  = ρut|t. 
Notice how the optimal estimates of gt and ut  conditional on Jt,  gt|t and ut|t respectively, follow 
immediately from the two signal equations (3.12) and (3.13), once the optimal estimate of potential 
output, zt|t, is known. Therefore, the signal extraction (or filtering) problem solved by the policymaker 
reduces to an inference problem concerning the level of potential output. 
3.4  Mismeasurement of potential output and policymakers’ views about the  
state of the economy 
Let policymakers’ forecast errors concerning the variables zt, gt and ut conditional on the information 
set Jt be:  
t t t t t u u u − ≡ ~   (3.14) 
t t t t t g g g − ≡ ~   (3.15) 
t t t t t z z z − ≡ ~   (3.16) BIS Papers No 19  263
 
Using equations (3.12) and (3.13) the following useful relationship between these errors can be 
derived:  
t t t t t t u g z ~ ~ ~ = λ − = λ   (3.17) 
The last equation shows that overestimation of potential output ( 0 ~
| < t t z ) simultaneously implies an 
overestimation of the cost push shock and an underestimation of the demand shock. This is 
summarised in the following remark. 
Remark 1.  Potential output overestimation ( 0 ~
| | < − ≡ t t t t t z z z ) implies: 
(i)  demand shock underestimation ( 0 ~
| | > − ≡ t t t t t g g g ) 
(ii)  cost push shock overestimation ( 0 ~
| | < − ≡ t t t t t u u u ) 
Inequalities with opposite signs hold when  . 0 ~
| > t t z  
The intuition underlying this result can be understood by reference to equations (3.12) and (3.13). The 
first equation implies that an increase in s1,t is always and optimally interpreted as being due partly to 
an increase in zt and partly to an increase in gt. Similarly, an increase in s2,t is interpreted as partly due 
to an increase in gt and partly to an increase in ut. Thus, when only zt increases, part of this increase is 
interpreted as an increase in potential output, but the remainder is interpreted as an increase in gt. As 
a consequence the error in forecasting zt is positive and the error in forecasting gt is negative, 
producing a negative correlation between the forecast errors in those two variables. Since s2,t does 
not change the (erroneously) perceived increase in gt is interpreted as a decrease in ut, producing a 
positive forecast error for this variable and, therefore, a positive correlation between the forecast 
errors in ut and in zt. 
3.5  Consequences of forecast errors in potential output for monetary policy,  
inflation and the output gap 
Remark 1 shows how mismeasurement of potential output distorts policymakers’ perceptions about 
cyclical conditions (cost push and demand shocks). The purpose of this subsection is to answer the 
following question: how do such noisy perceptions about the phase of the cycle affect monetary policy, 
inflation and the output gap? We do this by comparing the values of those variables in the presence of 
the PTC with their values in the benchmark case in which there is no such confusion. In the 
benchmark case, policymakers possess in each period direct information about the realisations of the 
shocks up to and including the previous period. Formally, in the absence of the PTC policymakers 
possess, at the beginning of period t + 1, the information set 
∗
t J  that is defined by: 
} , 2 , 1 , 0 , , { K = = − −
∗ i u g J J i t i t t t  (3.18) 
3.5.1  Consequences for monetary policy 
We begin by studying the determinants of the difference between the settings of monetary policy in the 
presence and in the absence of the PTC. Using equations (3.8), (3.14), (3.15) and (3.17), the deviation 
of the optimal interest rate in the presence of the PTC from its optimal value in the absence of this 
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It follows immediately from equation (3.19) that if demand shocks are sufficiently persistent in 




> µ ), the deviation of the real interest rate from its full information 
counterpart moves in the same direction as the forecast error in potential output ( t t z |
~ ). Although one 
cannot rule out the possibility that, when the persistence in cost shocks is sufficiently larger than that 
of demand shocks, the opposite occurs, it appears that the first case seems more likely a priori. The 
reason is that the persistence parameter of the cost shocks is multiplied by a fraction implying that 
1 + ∆ t r  and  t t z |
~  are positively related even if ρ is larger than µ, but not by too much. Note that the smaller 
the (Rogoff (1985) type) conservativeness of the central bank (the higher α), the more likely it is that 
1 + ∆ t r  and  t t z |
~  are positively related even when ρ is larger than µ. Hence, for central banks which are 
(using Svensson’s (1997) terminology) relatively flexible inflation targeters, the case in which  1 + ∆ t r  and 
t t z |
~  are positively related is definitely the more likely one for most or all values of ρ and µ in the range 
between zero and one. The various possible effects of imperfect information are summarised in the 
following proposition: 











policy is driven mainly by “demand shocks” considerations. This implies that potential output 
over/underestimation (causing the demand shock to be under/overestimated) leads to real rates which 
are lower/higher than the rate which is optimal in the absence of the PTC. 











 monetary policy is driven 
mainly by “cost push shocks” considerations. This implies that potential output over/underestimation 
(causing the cost push shock to be over/underestimated) leads to a real rate which is higher/lower 
than the rate that is optimal in the absence of the PTC. 
To understand the intuition underlying the proposition, it is useful to consider the case in which there 
is, in period t, a negative shock to potential output and no changes in the cyclical shocks, g and u. This 
leads, as of the beginning of period t + 1, to overestimation of potential output in period t ( 0 ~
| < t t z ). 
Remark 1 implies that this overestimation is associated with an overestimation of the cost shock and 
an underestimation of the demand shock of period t. 
The policy chosen at the beginning of period t + 1 aims to offset the (presumed) deflationary impact of 
the demand shock on the output gap and the (presumed) inflationary impact of the cost shock on 
inflation. In comparison to the no PTC benchmark, the first objective pushes policy towards 
expansionism while the second pushes it towards restrictiveness. If demand shocks are relatively 
persistent, the first effect dominates since policymakers believe that most of what they perceive to be 
a negative demand shock in period t is going to persist into period t + 1 while what they perceive to be 
a positive cost shock in period t is not going to persist into period t + 1. Hence, in this case monetary 
policy is more expansionary than in the no PTC benchmark and  1 + ∆ t r and  t t z |
~ are positively related 
(case (i) in the proposition). But if the reverse is true (cost shocks are relatively more persistent), 
beliefs about the cost shock in period t  + 1 dominate policy, pushing it towards tightening. As a 
consequence, monetary policy is more restrictive than in the no PTC benchmark and  1 + ∆ t r  and  t t z |
~  are 
negatively related and case (ii) of the proposition obtains. 
3.5.2  Consequences for the output gap and inflation 
We turn next to the consequences of mismeasurement of potential output for the output gap and 
inflation. The objective is, as in the previous subsection, to analyse the deviations of the outcomes 
obtained in the presence of the PTC from those that arise in its absence. Using equations (3.9) and 
(3.10), the logical next step is to relate these deviations to the interest rate deviations studied above. 
This yields:  
1 1 1 1 +
∗
+ + + ∆ ϕ − = − ≡ ∆ t t t t r x x x  (3.21) BIS Papers No 19  265
 
1 1 1 1 +
∗
+ + + ∆ ϕλ − = π − π ≡ π ∆ t t t t r  (3.22) 
where 
∗
+1 t x  and 
∗
+ π 1 t  are the values of the output gap and inflation under optimal monetary policy in the 
absence of the PTC. These equations show that when the interest rate is below (above) its value in 
the absence of the PTC both inflation and the output gap are above (below) their no PTC values. 
The case of overexpansionary monetary policy (case (i) of proposition 1) is consistent with the 
empirical results in Orphanides (2000a,b, 2001), according to which, during the 1970s, US monetary 
policy was overly expansionary due to an overestimation of potential output and an associated 
underestimation of the output gap. Obviously, this underestimation could have been due to inefficient 
forecasting procedures on the part of the Fed. A main message of this paper is that this effect is 
present even if monetary policy is ex ante optimal and forecasting procedures are as efficient as 
possible. In normal times, during which the change in potential output is not too far from its mean, this 
effect is likely to be small and short-lived. But when large permanent shocks to potential output occur, 
this effect is likely to be large and more persistent. This point is discussed in detail in the next section. 
3.6  Optimal potential output forecasts 
This section describes the solution to the signal extraction problem faced by policymakers. To convey 
the intuition of the basic mechanisms at work, we focus in the text on the particular (but simpler) case 
in which demand and cost push shocks are equally persistent (µ = ρ), which yields a tractable closed 
form solution without affecting the key properties of the predictor.
5 
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St–i is a combined signal that summarises all the relevant information from a period’s t − i data. Note 
that it is positively related to that period’s potential output and demand shock, and negatively related to 
that period’s cost shock. As a consequence, the optimal predictor generally responds positively to 
current as well as to all past shocks to demand and potential output, and responds negatively to 
current as well as to all past, cost shocks. 
The conditional forecast equation (3.23) possesses several key properties. First, since a and κ are 
both bounded between zero and one, the current optimal predictor is positively related to the current 
as well as to all past signals. Second, the weight given to a past signal is smaller the further in the past 
that signal is. Third, since a < 1, when a positive (negative) innovation to current potential output (zt) 
occurs, the potential output estimate increases (decreases) by less than actual potential output. 
Fourth, the sum of the coefficients in the optimal predictor in equation (3.23) is equal to one. Finally, 
note that although the true value of potential output is contained only in the signals s1,t–i, the optimal 
predictor assigns positive weights also to the signals s2,t–i. The intuitive reason is that, by allowing a 
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more precise evaluation of the demand shock, gt, the utilisation of s2,t–i facilitates the separation of gt 
from zt in the signals s1,t–i. 
3.6.1  Serial correlation in forecast errors of potential output 
The form of the optimal predictor in equation (3.23), in conjunction with the fact that all coefficients are 
positive and sum to one, implies that when a single shock to potential output occurs (say) in period t 
and persists forever without any further shocks to potential output, policymakers do not recognise its 
full impact immediately. Although their forecasting is optimal, policymakers learn about the permanent 
change in potential output gradually. Initially (in period t + 1) they adjust their perception of potential 
output by the fraction a. In period t + 2 they internalise the larger fraction a + (1 − a)(1− κ), in period 
t + 3 they internalise the even larger fraction a + (1 − a)(1 − κ) + (1 − a)(1 − κ)κ, and so on. After a large 
number of periods this fraction tends to 1, implying that after a sufficiently large number of periods the 
full size of the shock is ultimately learned. Thus, equation (3.23) implies that there is gradual learning 
about potential output and that forecast errors are, therefore, on the same side of zero during this 
process. 
Conversely, when a single relatively large shock to one of the cyclical components of demand occurs it 
is partially interpreted for some time as a change in potential output. This too creates ex post serial 
correlation in errors of forecast in the output gap and in potential output. In general, two kinds of errors 
can be made. A change in potential output may be partly misinterpreted as a cyclical change, or a 
cyclical change may be partly misinterpreted as a change in potential output. Both types of errors tend 
to create ex post serial correlation in errors of forecast. But this serial correlation cannot be utilised in 
real time to improve policy because, contrary to errors of forecasts of variables which become known 
with certainty one period after their realisation, the potential output of period t is not known with 
certainty even after that period. As a consequence the forecast error committed in period t cannot be 
used to “correct” future forecasts of potential output in the same manner that errors of forecast of a 
variable that is revealed one period after the formation of that forecast are normally used to update 
future forecasts.
6 
As a matter of fact, it can be shown that forecast errors of potential output and of the output gap are 
generally serially correlated even in the population. The remainder of this subsection establishes this 
fact more precisely and identifies conditions under which this serial correlation is dominated by the 
variability of innovations to potential output. Note first, from equation (3.17), that the error in 
forecasting the output gap is equal to minus the error of forecast in potential output. Hence, if errors of 
forecast of potential output are serially correlated, so are errors of forecast of the output gap. It is 
shown in Appendix C in Cukierman and Lippi (2002) that the covariance between two adjacent 
forecast errors is: 
0 ] ~ ~ [ 1 | 1 > − − t t t t z z E  
This leads to the following: 
Proposition 2. Errors in forecasting potential output and the output gap generally display a positive 
serial correlation. 
Interestingly, this proposition is consistent with recent empirical findings in Orphanides (2000a). 
Orphanides utilises real-time data on the perceptions of policymakers about potential output during the 
1970s and compares those perceptions with current estimates of the historical data. Taking the 
“current” rendition of estimates of potential output as a proxy for the true values of potential output 
during the 1970s, he finds highly persistent deviations between the current and the real-time estimates 
of the output gap (see his Graph 3 in particular). 
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assumed, the general principle that forecast errors are serially uncorrelated in the population applies. This feature has been 
used extensively to test for the efficiency of financial markets. However, when, as is the case here, the true value of the 
variable that is being forecasted is not revealed afterwards, forecast errors are in general serially correlated. BIS Papers No 19  267
 
3.7  A quantitative illustration 
As a practical illustration of the effects described above, we present an impulse response analysis of 
the effects of a potential output shock under imperfect information. The numerical implementation of 
this exercise relies on the algorithms discussed in Gerali and Lippi (2002). We parametrise our model 
economy using the settings reported in Table 1 (corresponding to the long-run elasticities reported in 
the model of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)).  
 
Table 1 
Baseline parameter values for CL model 
Parameters Innovations  (std) 
β  α  λ  ρ  µ  ϕ  σz σ u σ g 
0.99  1  0.14 0.7  0.7  1  0.5  1.5 1.5 
 
The example below illustrates the impulse response of the main variables in the system to a unit shock in 
potential output. Graph 1 illustrates how, with imperfect information, the signal extraction problem faced 
by the policymaker creates confusion about the sources of the business cycle fluctuations. 
Graph 1 
Perceived state of the economy in response to a potential output shock 
















Loss under discretion:  302.707   
The upper panel displays the true pattern followed by the (unit root) potential output shock. The 
estimated pattern for this shock (computed with a Kalman filter) is traced out in the second panel. As 
the theory showed, the learning process is gradual and the forecast errors display a positive serial 
correlation. The two remaining panels illustrate how misperceptions about potential output cause 
misperceptions about the cost push and demand shocks, the true value of which is identically zero in 
this experiment (these relationships obey equation (3.17)). It is evident that an underestimated 
potential output level implies an overestimated demand shock (to “explain” the currently high output 
level observed) and an underestimated cost shock (consistent with the relatively low realised inflation). 268  BIS Papers No 19
 
Quantitatively, of the true 1% increase in potential output only 0.3 is estimated initially, while about 
0.7 percentage points of the output rise are attributed to the demand shock. 
The policy consequences of these misperceptions are depicted in Graph 2. The parameters chosen 










 is satisfied, implying that monetary policy is driven mainly by 
“demand shocks” considerations (see Proposition 1). Recall that, under the complete information 
benchmark, there should be no policy response following this shock, ie the optimal interest rate path 
should be identically zero. The graph shows how, under imperfect information, a positive innovation in 
potential output causes interest rates to rise above their optimal level in the absence of PTC. This 
causes the true output gap to fall (even though the policymaker perceives a positive output gap!) and 
inflation to be lower than under the no PTC benchmark. This is how the model rationalises a situation 
like the 1990s, when high output growth is associated with low inflation. 
Graph 2 
Macro effects of a potential output shock with imperfect information 
















Loss under discretion:  302.707   
For a more realistic assessment of the quantitative effect of imperfect information, we repeated the 
exercise developed above using the model of the US economy of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). 
Graph 3 reports the values of a given variable under imperfect information in deviation from the values 
recorded under the full information benchmark (ie potential output is known) after a 1% increase of the 
output gap. The upper panel shows that, following the shock in potential output, the policymaker’s 
forecast error for the output gap is very large (almost none of the shock is predicted initially) and highly 
persistent (it takes about two years to learn half of the shock). The interest rate is higher than under 
full information, as almost all of the output expansion is interpreted as a cyclical shock. As a 
consequence, both output and inflation are below their full information counterpart (lower panel). 
A back-of-the-envelope calculation can be used to compare the magnitudes predicted by our model 
with the events of the 1970s. If we take Orphanides’ measures of the forecast errors in the output gap 
for the 1970s, hovering about 5 percentage points, we have to scale all the effects in Graph 3 by a 
factor of −5 (so that the measured forecast error in the output gap is matched in size and sign). This 
implies that the interest rate under incomplete information is more than 5 percentage points below the 
full information counterpart during the year following the shock. Moreover, the exercise indicates that BIS Papers No 19  269
 
inflation and the output gap record a maximum deviation from the full information benchmark of about 
2 and 3.5 percentage points, respectively. While those numbers are not too small, indicating that 
imperfect information might contribute to explain the higher than average inflation recorded in the mid-
1970s, they admittedly only go part of the way, leaving a significant part of that inflationary burst 
unexplained. 
Graph 3 
Effects of imperfect information (potential output shock) 
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4.  Application 2: a “new synthesis” model (from Gerali and Lippi (2002)) 
In this section, we use the toolkit derived in Gerali and Lippi (2002) to analyse the real-time information 
problem of monetary policy within a version of the sticky price framework developed by, among others,  
Woodford (1999) and Clarida et al (1999). In that framework, output (yt) and inflation (πt) are 
determined, respectively, by a dynamic IS curve and a Phillips curve, according to:
7 
t t t t t t t g i y y + π − σ − = + + ] [ 1 1  (4.1) 
t t t t t t u y y + − κ + δπ = π + ) ( 1  (4.2) 
                                                       
7   These conditions are derived from the optimising behaviour of consumers (ie an intertemporal Euler equation) and price-
setting monopoly firms facing a randomly staggered price adjustment mechanism as in Calvo (1983). 270  BIS Papers No 19
 
where  t y  denotes potential output as of period t (ie the output level that would obtain under flexible 
prices), it the nominal interest rate, gt a demand shock and ut a cost push shock. The output gap is 
defined as the difference between actual and potential output,  . t t y y −  
Following Clarida et al (1999, henceforth referred to as the CGG model), we assume the economy is 
subject to three types of shocks: demand (gt), cost push (ut) and potential output ( t y ˆ ). They obey the 
following processes:  
) , 0 ( ~ ˆ ; 1 0 ˆ 2
ˆ 1 y t t t t N y y y y σ < γ < + γ = −  (4.3a) 
) , 0 ( ~ ˆ ; 1 0 ˆ 2
1 g t t t t N g g g g σ < µ < + µ = −  (4.3b) 
) , 0 ( ~ ˆ ; 1 0 ˆ
2
1 u t t t t N u u u u σ < ρ < + ρ = −  (4.3c) 
where the innovations  1 ˆ
+ t y ,  1 ˆ
+ t u  and  1 ˆ
+ t g  are iid. Let us assume the measurable variables are given by:  
t y t
o
t y y θ + =   (4.4a) 
yt t
o
t y y θ + =   (4.4b) 
t t
o
t π θ + π = π   (4.4c) 




1 *) ( *) ( x y y L t t y t t − − λ + π − π ≡  (4.5) 
which allows us to encompass some special cases of interest, as done theoretically by Clarida et al 
(1999).
8 
We introduce imperfect information by adding noise to the measurement block (equation (4.4)). This 
amounts to assuming that potential output, actual output and inflation are subject to the measurement 
errors reported in Table 2. With imperfect information, the policymaker uses the available information 
to form an estimate about the true state of the economy (ie Xt|t). 
 
Table 2 
Baseline parameter values for CGG model (from Gerali and Lippi (2002)) 
Parameters 
δ  γ  ρ  µ  κ  σ  λy  x*  π* 
0.99 0.7  0.4  0.3 0.05 2.0 0.25 0.0  0.0 
Innovations (std)  Measurement errors (std) 
y σ   u σ   g σ   y θ σ   y θ σ   θπ σ  




Graph 4 illustrates the effect of a cost push shock under discretion. The first obvious difference with 
respect to the complete information case is that the true pattern of the shock now differs from the one 
estimated by the policymaker, as shown in the two upper panels. 
                                                       
8   Among these is the presence of a systematic inflation bias, x* > 0. BIS Papers No 19  271
 
Graph 4 























The signal extraction problem solved with the Kalman filter leads the policymaker to learn only 
gradually about the realisation of the cost push shock: in the current setup, after a unitary cost push 
shock (ut = 1) occurs, the contemporaneous estimate of the shock by the policymaker is ut|t = 0.70. 
Naturally, the magnitude of the forecast errors induced by imperfect information depends on the 
assumptions about the properties of the fundamental processes (eg the persistence of the various 
structural shocks g, u and y and the signal to noise ratios encoded in 
2
u Σ  and 
2
v Σ ). For instance, if we 
double the amount of noise in the inflation equation (ie raise σθπ), the estimated value of the shock is 





Through its effect on the expectations about the state of the economy (eg Xt|t), imperfect information 
affects the dynamics of the forward-looking variables. First, the policy response of it is less strong than 
in the full information case, as the perceived size of the cost push shock is smaller.
10 The response of 
output and of inflation is also muted in comparison to the complete information case: output falls by 
0.24 (versus 0.32) while inflation increases by 1.4 (versus 1.6). This is due both to the policy response 
and to the fact that the future expected values of the cost push shock are smaller under incomplete 
information than under complete information, thus inducing the private economy to expect a different 
pattern of future shocks and policy. 
                                                       
9  Several key objects produced by the filtering problem are computed by our MATLAB code, such as the matrices P and Po 
corresponding, respectively, to the one-step-ahead and contemporaneous forecast errors in Xt. 
10    Due to the certainty equivalence feature of our problem, policy differences stemming from imperfect information arise 
entirely from the estmates of the states as the coefficient F in the optimal control function (It = FXt|t) does not depend on the 
uncertainty. 272  BIS Papers No 19
 
4.1  The macroeconomic consequences of unobservable potential output in  
the CGG model 
We next explore the effects of imperfect information about potential output in the CGG model (under 
discretionary policy). Several contributions of Orphanides show that potential output estimates are 
very imprecise in real time. It is argued that basing policy on the estimates of such an unobservable 
(and noisy) variable may be at the root of important differences between policy based on real-time 
information and the optimal policy under complete information. To formalise this argument within the 
CGG model, we compute the effects of a potential output shock in the presence of, respectively, full 
and incomplete information. The difference in the dynamics of the endogenous variables between 
these two settings measures the effect of imperfect information. 
Graph 5 shows the effect of a potential output shock with full information. The interest rate adjusts in 
such a way that the dynamics of actual output optimally replicate those of potential output (compare 
the upper two panels in the graph), eg the “output gap” is nil. This policy poses no trade-off between 
the objectives of the policymaker, and therefore inflation remains constant at its steady state level. 
Graph 5 





















Loss under discretion:  0.0020839   
The same potential output shock leads to different consequences under imperfect information, as 
shown in Graph 6. The upper two panels reveal that the true shock is only partially identified by the 
policymaker in real time, and that a cost push shock (third panel) is perceived by the policymaker while 
no such a shock has occurred in reality. 
Graph 7, which compares the dynamic response of interest rates, output and inflation under 
incomplete versus complete information, shows that the interest rate (both nominal and real) is 
relatively loose (ie is reduced by a smaller amount) under incomplete information. This occurs 
because, as potential output is underestimated (with incomplete information), the policymaker’s 
perception of how much the interest rate needs to be lowered is smaller than under complete 
information (recall that the interest rate is proportional to the expected output growth - see 
equation (4.1)). Therefore, the interest rate under complete information is loose in comparison to the BIS Papers No 19  273
 
full information benchmark.
11 As a consequence of different policy and expectations, the dynamics of 
inflation and the output gap under imperfect information differ from their complete information 
benchmark. The lower panel shows that, following a positive potential output shock, both inflation and 
the output gap are lower than their full information counterpart. 
Graph 6 


























Loss under discretion:  0.0021098   
                                                       
11  There is a second effect which goes in the opposite direction but is dominated under most plausible parameter values. It 
arises because the perceived negative cost push (under incomplete information) leads the policymaker to lower the interest 
rate (no effect under full information since there is no cost push shock). 274  BIS Papers No 19
 
Graph 7 
Effects of imperfect information 
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